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This research enters new ground by presenting comparative survey evidence on as-
set managers' views and behavior in the United States, Germany, Japan and Thai-
land. Relying on Hofstede's four cultural dimensions, we find that cultural differences 
are most helpful in understanding country differences which cannot be explained by 
pure economic reasoning. In short, controlling for various determinants, the dimen-
sion of more Individualism predicts less herding behavior, more Power Distance 
leads to older and comparatively less experienced managers in the upper hierarchy, 
Masculinity brings men into top positions and to higher volumes of assets under per-
sonal responsibility, and Uncertainty Avoidance is related to higher safety margins 
against the tracking error allowed and relatively more research effort. These conse-
quences, i.e. the culturally different importance of herding, age, experience, gender, 
tracking error and research effort, clearly affect investment behavior, although in a 
complex way.
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Does Culture Influence 
Asset Managers’ Views and Behavior? 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This research enters new ground by presenting comparative survey evidence on 
asset managers' views and behavior in the United States, Germany, Japan and 
Thailand. Relying on Hofstede's four cultural dimensions, we find that cultural differ-
ences are most helpful in understanding country differences that cannot be ex-
plained by pure economic reasoning. In short, controlling for various determinants, 
the dimension of more Individualism predicts less herding behavior, and more Power 
Distance leads to older and comparatively less experienced managers in the upper 
hierarchy, Masculinity brings men into top positions and to higher volumes of assets 
under personal responsibility, and Uncertainty Avoidance is related to higher safety 
margins against the tracking error allowed and relatively more research effort. These 
consequences (i.e. the culturally different importance of herding, age, experience, 
gender, tracking error and research effort) clearly affect investment behavior, al-
though in a complex way. 
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2 
Does Culture Influence Asset Managers’ Views and Behavior? 
 
 
1 Introduction 
International financial markets have been the outriders of globalization during the 
last decades. Asset managers who manage huge volumes, typically billions of Dol-
lars, for banks, insurance companies or mutual funds invest their entrusted assets 
globally as a matter of course. Moreover, their decisions are based on theories 
about capital markets and optimal portfolio allocation that are globally uniform. Thus, 
we would expect asset managers' behavior to be influenced by incentives resulting 
from their age, experience, education, and so on, and from idiosyncratic institutional 
details, but not really by cultural aspects. With the help of a questionnaire survey, 
we analyze asset managers' views and behavior in the market by considering re-
spondents’ attributes such as gender, experience, position or their firm's size as well 
as selected fund characteristics. At the heart of this research is the question of 
whether cultural differences, as predicted by cultural theory, have any systematic 
influence on the actors of the international asset management industry. 
We do indeed find asset management to be a global business that shows some 
common global aspects such as strong reliance on fundamental data and related 
strategies. However, we also find country-specific differences that can hardly be ex-
plained by capital market theory but that are consistent with a cultural influence on 
views and behavior instead. 
Defining “culture” has been of scientific interest for centuries (for a critical re-
view, see Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). We rely on the comprehensive, empirically 
based understanding by Hofstede (1980). He defines culture as collective program-
ming of the mind that is primarily manifested in values and norms, but also more su-
perficially visible in rituals and symbols. This so-called mental programming (also 
referred to as “software of the mind”) is stable over time and implies the same per-
son showing consistently similar behavior in similar situations. When talking about 
culture, Hofstede refers to national culture.  
There have been several research streams in cultural theory in the past dec-
ades, and cross-cultural research as a multidisciplinary approach ranges from cogni-
tive and social psychology, sociology, anthropology and history, up to management 
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3 
science and economics. This broad and vivid field of research encompasses a vari-
ety of approaches and frameworks for cross-cultural analyses.
1
  
In order to examine and compare the viewpoints and behavior of asset manag-
ers from four countries, we refer to Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimension 
framework and his country scores given as index numbers for each single country.
2
 
We account for all four of his original dimensions, namely “Individualism” (IDV), 
“Power Distance” (PDI), “Masculinity” (MAS), and “Uncertainty Avoidance” (UAI). 
Further explanations of the single dimensions will be given in Section 4.  
Regarding our selection of countries, we consider asset managers from the 
United States, Germany, Japan, and Thailand. At first glance, one might be tempted 
to expect a simple Eastern-Western differentiation. However, when taking a closer 
look at the exact dimension scores given by Hofstede for o r four surveyed coun-
tries, the differences over all dimensions become clearly evident (see Figure 1). Ac-
cording to Hofstede, the United States and Germany are closer to each other than 
they are to Japan and Thailand. Nevertheless, the latter are far away from being 
similar. Especially regarding Hofstede’s dimension of Masculinity, they deviate sig-
nificantly. Even without going into detail yet, analyses can be expected to be surely 
more complex than they might seem at first sight. 
Thus far, cross-cultural research papers have mostly focused on one cultural 
dimension only. Especially the Individualism dimension is much researched. It has 
been (re-)defined, analyzed in detail, and combined with selected topics
3
, both, theo-
retically and empirically (see Triadis 1995 or Oysermann et al., 2002 for a broad 
overview). Among most recent studies Hwang et al. (2003) and Green et al. (2005) 
provide interesting cross-cultural psychology research input on Individualism. Chui 
                                                        
1
  Approaches to unambiguously distinguish cultural groups from each other could be based on dif-
ferent cultural dimensions as suggested by Hofstede (1980, 2001), Hall (1985), Hall and Hall 
(1990) or House et al. (2004), on grid/group typologies and cultural prototyping (see e.g. Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982, Rayner and Cantor 1987, Thompson et al. 1990, or Dake 1991) or on factors 
such as professional or ideological affiliations that, as the former, are often used for risk-related 
cultural research (see e.g. Rohrmann and Renn 2000, Sjöberg et al. 2000). 
2
  Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are based on a global written survey conducted within the IBM 
group in the late 1960s and by beginning of the 1970s. Altogether 116,000 questionnaires from 
more than 70 countries were collected. Though not without pitfalls, this all-time comprehensive 
data set assures Hofstede’s recognition and uniqueness until today (see Kagitcibasi 1997). 
3
  Shafiro et al. (2003) or, for example, Nesdale and Naito (2005) combine their analysis of Individu-
alism with gender aspects, Kemmelmeier et al. (2003) take authoritarianism (i.e. the individual de-
gree of compliance with social norms and (political) authority, into additional account). Shuper et 
al. (2004) do not only consider Hofstede’s dimension of Individualism but also include Weinstein’s 
(1980) measure of unrealistic optimism as well as Hofstede’s dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance. 
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4 
et al. (2005) are the first to apply Hofstede’s Individualism index to financial market 
return patterns.
4
 
Hofstede’s study and its dimensions are definitely not without critics. In more 
detail, Baskerville (2003) provides a thorough discussion of issues predominantly 
raised by anthropologists and sociologists regarding the theoretical underpinnings of 
Hofstede’s approach. Critical aspects include the chosen methodology of equating 
nation states with culture instead of allowing for maximal diversity also within a na-
tion state, the neglected influence of organizational culture as well as the frame-
work’s creation mainly from the managerial perspective, the difficulties linked to a 
quantification of culture in forms of rigid indexes, and the general assumption of sta-
bility in cultural differences over time. In particular the latter point has been crucially 
explained by Inglehart (see e.g. Inglehart and Baker 2000 or Welzel et al. 2003). 
Reviewing cultural change with the help of several waves of his so-called World 
Value surveys, Inglehart recently gained broad acceptance among sociologists. All 
of the above mentioned critics keep on setting incentives to test the validity of 
Hofstede’s dimensions as done, for example, by Merritt (2000). Examining the be-
havior of a broad sample of commercial airline pilots in 19 countries, she was able 
both to replicate all four dimensions statistically and to find support that culture ex-
erts a non-neglectable influence on professional pilots’ behavior. Thus, the role and 
relevance of Hofstede’s dimensions at least as a description of national manage-
ment culture cannot be denied. 
Accordingly, having the critical arguments in mind, we rely on Hofstede’s di-
mensions as cultural framework. Analyzing asset manager’s viewpoints and behavior 
with the help of a questionnaire survey designed from an economic point of view, we 
access Hofstede’s work as an analytical grid and aim at deducing structured contri-
butions to the field of cross-cultural research. Indeed, with our analysis we overcome 
several recent shortcomings in many cross-cultural studies (see e.g. Renn and 
Rohrmann 2000, p. 227) and add the following benefits to the existing body of litera-
ture. First, we do not analyze another student sample, but we were able to convince 
                                                        
4
  Further recent examples of incorporating culture into economic and financial research are pro-
vided, for example, by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Frederking (2002), or Stulz and Williamson 
(2003). 
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5 
asset managers to participate in our survey study.
5
 Managing huge volumes of as-
sets in international financial markets, these professionals and their perceptions and 
behaviors exert an influence on prices as well as market developments. Second, we 
are able to distinguish gender aspects and to consider individual demographic and 
occupation-related factors such as age, experience, position, working effort, and 
company size. Third, we highlight that we consider a broad and diverse sample and 
thus are able to overcome the restrictions implied by the so-called “generation effect” 
of younger people being on the one hand more prepared to take risks but on the 
other hand less brave regarding individual behavior due to a lack of experience and 
reputation. Indeed, we consider the whole range of asset managers regarding age, 
experience and position. Fourth, our sample asset managers are asked about their 
market perception, their individual behavior and their attitudes, for example, regard-
ing risk, not from a general perspective related to hazards people might fear and that 
have been addressed in several studies (see e.g. Slovic et al. 2000 or Sjöberg et al. 
2000) but all related to their every day business. Fifth, by considering asset manag-
ers from two Asian countries, namely Japan and Thailand, as well as from Germany 
and from the United States, we deviate from the often observable concentration on 
the United States and Europe and are able to check critically for an easily done 
Eastern versus Western split. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes design 
and methodology of the survey as well as the generated data set. Section 3 focuses 
on common aspects in global asset management. In Section 4 we analyze differ-
ences in asset managers’ view points and behavior by relying on Hofstede’s dimen-
sions as analytical framework. Section 5 discusses implications of cultural influ-
ences. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Survey design and data 
Our analyses are based on data from an international written survey conducted 
with asset managers in four countries in 2003/2004. Altogether we generated a sam-
ple of 1025 questionnaires, comprising 148 questionnaires from the United States, 
263 from Germany, 488 from Japan and 126 questionnaires from Thailand.  
                                                        
5
  Effects of occupational factors on, for example, subjective risk perception and interpretation have 
been found by several researchers (see e.g. Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, p. 36). 
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6 
We prepared our survey by previous oral interviews with asset managers from 
various investment companies in several cities in the different countries. Especially 
for an international survey, it is most important to speak in the right language. Both 
questions and response categories had to be clearly understandable and in common 
wording, relevant for the respective market and, if necessary, country-specifically 
adapted. A test run of the questionnaire assured its comprehensibility. 
As we successfully convinced participating asset managers to act as multipliers 
within their companies by forwarding blank questionnaires to their colleagues and 
team members, we do not report a response rate regarding the number of question-
naires sent out. Altogether, however, we obtained a participation rate of 47.5% of 
investment companies.
6
 In detail, we contacted the top 250 US asset management 
firms ranked by worldwide assets under management and received response from 
asset managers of 74 different companies (participation rate of US firms: 29.6%). In 
Germany, we sent questionnaires to 66 member firms of the German Investment 
Management Association 'BVI' with major investment segments in equities and 
bonds, respectively, and asset managers of 51 different companies participated in 
the survey (participation rate of German firms: 77.3%). The high participation rate of 
German companies is also attributable to the letter of recommendation by the 'BVI'. 
In Japan, we cooperated with the Daiwa Research Institute that provided us access 
to all major and core asset management companies. Their letter of recommendation 
encouraged participation and assured academic purpose only. In the end, 46 of 74 
contacted asset management companies participated in our survey (participation 
rate of Japanese companies: 62.2%). In Thailand, we received responses from 29 of 
31 contacted member companies of the 'AIMC', the Thai Association of Investment 
Management Companies (participation rate of Thai firms: 93.5%). Once again, the 
extraordinarily high participation rate is attributable to the recommendation and very 
helpful support of the 'AIMC'. 
Regarding representativeness of our collected data sample, we compare the 
structure of the asset management industry in each country with the one of our re-
                                                        
6
  Compared to similarly designed surveys as presented by Shiller and Pound (1989) with participa-
tion rates of 45% or Menkhoff and Schmidt (2005) with 59% regarding companies, our response 
rates represent a reasonable result. Moreover, our total number of participants, 1025 altogether, is 
also convincing compared to other cross-cultural survey studies such as Shuper et al. with 535 
participants from two countries, Kemmelmeier et al. with 1018 participants from seven different 
countries or Kühnen et al. (2001) comprised of 422 participants from four countries. 
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7 
spective country sample data set. As shown in Table 1 the null hypothesis of no dif-
ference cannot be rejected in any country’s case. Moreover, bigger investment com-
panies typically employ more asset managers and thus have a higher market impact 
than smaller investment companies. The same can be found in our country sub 
samples: asset managers working for bigger companies participated significantly 
more in our survey over all countries. Besides, survey studies may face criticism re-
garding data quality and target group width and appropriateness. Regarding this 
study, there are two cogent counterarguments: First, due to guaranteed anonymity of 
all participants, strategic answering is unlikely. Second, strategic answering would 
be useless from an individual point of view as the benefit of influencing results is 
marginal for a single person and as the costs of professionals with limited time are 
obviously high. As an indication of the usefulness of our data, the current position of 
respondents within their companies for each country sub sample is shown in Table 
2. Obviously, the firms’ hierarchy is reflected in the sample. For universality of re-
sponses it is of particular significance that answers were not primarily given by less 
experienced and less influential junior asset managers but by a broad and balanced 
sample of asset managers. Moreover, additional exemplary data on age, experience 
and weekly working hours, given in Table 2 as well, prove the sample to be consis-
tent in its structure. 
In addition, Table 3 sheds light on the distribution of asset managers’ re-
sponses regarding three main fund characteristics: the fund type, the investment 
segment and the degree of active management (i.e. the tracking error which the indi-
vidual asset manager is allowed to take). In all four countries, the management of 
pension (and private) funds dominates the one of mutual funds, with the difference 
being most pronounced in Japan and least in Thailand. Moreover, equity funds 
dominate bond funds in the United States, Germany and Japan, while Thailand is 
rather fixed-income funds oriented. Finally, comparing the degree of active man-
agement, a high tracking error is most common for Japanese professionals, followed 
by U.S., German, and finally Thai asset managers. 
 
3 Common aspects in global asset management 
In our study we consider asset managers who act as professionals in global financial 
markets. New approaches from the area of behavioral finance already take behav-
Page 9 of 39
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
 
8 
ioral biases of human actors into account and thus contribute to a more complete 
understanding of financial markets and its participants (Shiller 2003). Nevertheless, 
the traditional capital market theory about risk and return of a well diversified finan-
cial portfolio (as reflected in the seminal studies by Markowitz 1952, Sharpe 1964, 
and Fama 1970) is globally taught and unmistakably understood as the basis of port-
folio management. Accordingly, we expect to detect some common worldwide char-
acteristics that are inherent to the asset management industry, its structure, market 
players’ behavior, and strategies. 
First of all, as we have seen in Table 2, common factors among all four coun-
tries apply very generally to the combination of personal characteristics and career 
development. Overall, holding higher positions in an asset management company 
seems positively associated with higher age, longer experience, slightly higher work-
ing effort and higher managed asset volumes under personal responsibility. 
Furthermore, we asked all surveyed asset managers about the relevance of 
fundamentals and the importance of different investment strategies (see Table 4). 
When assuming a globally shared portfolio theory, one would expect large commu-
nality in investment approaches, too. Indeed, being questioned about the relevance 
of fundamentals, an overwhelming majority of asset managers from all four countries 
agrees on their extremely high relevance. This is substantiated by the fact that fun-
damental information is also clearly most relevant in comparison to further sources 
of information used in making investment decisions, such as discussions with col-
leagues or decisions and opinions of others (in the following Section 4, we return to 
these other sources in more detail). Due to this strong orientation towards funda-
mentals, one may be not surprised that the preferred investment strategy is also de-
rived from theory. In efficient markets it is rational to rely on a long-term orientated 
buy and hold strategy, especially when facing long-term investment horizons, and 
thus to refrain from following short-sighted sentiment driven trends and frequent 
portfolio shifts that might cause high transaction costs. 
Table 4 [B] shows that, indeed, the buy and hold strategy receives highest im-
portance in all four countries (rivaled by the momentum strategy in Germany only). 
However, it seems interesting to note that despite the strong reliance on fundamen-
tal facts and despite the preference for the buy and hold strategy, other strategies 
receive a surprisingly high amount of attention. Striking is the prominent position of 
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9 
the momentum strategy, that is, buying past winners and selling past losers, a find-
ing also confirmed by many studies (see Grinblatt et al. 1995) and in different sur-
veys (Menkhoff and Schmidt 2005). This strategy is definitely not rooted in financial 
theory and thus provides a clear hint that factors not captured by traditional capital 
market theory may play a role, too. 
In order to take possible cultural factors on asset managers’ views, behavior 
and the industry’s structure into account, we introduce a necessary cultural frame-
work below. 
 
4 Cross-cultural differences in global asset management 
In the following, we rely on Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions framework that 
consists of four dimensions that are explained briefly: The first dimension, “Individu-
alism” (IDV), as opposed to “Collectivism”, focuses on the degree of reinforcement of 
individual or collective achievements and interpersonal relationships. A high Indi-
vidualism ranking expresses individuality and individual rights being overriding in a 
society while personal relationships are loose. The second dimension, “Power Dis-
tance” (PDI), takes the extent of inequality among members of a country‘s society 
into account. A high Power Distance ranking implies that inequalities of power, pres-
tige, and wealth have been allowed to grow within the society and keep being ac-
cepted by its members. The third dimension, “Masculinity” (MAS) with its opposite 
pole of femininity, describes the extent of role division between sexes and its em-
phasis on the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, 
and power. A high Masculinity ranking indicates that a country experiences a high 
degree of gender differentiation. The fourth dimension, “Uncertainty Avoidance” 
(UAI), finally focuses on the extent to which members of a country’s society feel 
threatened by and thus try to avoid uncertain or ambiguous situations. A high Uncer-
tainty Avoidance ranking implies low tolerance for uncertainty, leading to the crea-
tion of a rule-oriented society.
7
 Hofstede (2001, p. 29) emphasizes his four dimen-
                                                        
7
 In a later study, Hofstede (2001) extended his original four dimensions by a fifth one, “long-term 
orientation”. We do not consider this additional dimension because it does not fit equally well to 
our approach. First, the original framework was developed for business professionals in a consis-
tent way whereas the extension is derived from a different source. Second, and more important 
here, the fifth dimension of “long-term orientation” does not fit well to asset managers’ behavior 
(despite its intuitive appeal) as long-term perspective is related to “thrift” (which is rather a cate-
gory of investors’ behavior) and short-term perspective is related to “respect for tradition” and “ful-
filling obligations” (where we are not aware of intuitive proxies in asset management). 
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10 
sions to be statistically independent of each other and to occur in all possible combi-
nations. 
 
4.1 Individualism 
According to Hofstede, the four considered countries can be clearly ranked regard-
ing their position on a continuum between Individualism and Collectivism. The high-
est Individualism scoring is given to the United States at 91 as its top dimension, 
followed by Germany, then Japan and the lowest for Thailand at 20. 
We analyze asset managers’ behavior in this dimension by taking a closer look 
at their trend following or so-called “herding” behavior, a phenomenon that remains 
highly discussed in both academics and practice and yet cannot be totally explained 
by rational motives (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001). Herding behavior in its prob-
lematic denotation means that investment decisions are solely based on observed 
investments of other investors (and not on own fundamental information as assumed 
by theory). Different types of such behavior can be traced back to informational cas-
cades (Bikhchandani et al. 1998) or reputation based herding (Scharfstein and Stein 
1990). It has been found empirically by Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and Hong et al. 
(2000) that younger managers who are more likely to be fired due to poor perform-
ance than their older colleagues deviate less from the herd than more experienced 
asset managers. 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of responses to the statement “I generally fol-
low the trend”. Evidently, Japan and Thailand show a much higher approval of col-
lectivistic behavior in forms of trend following than Germany or the United States. 
While a clear majority of asset managers from Thailand and Japan and still half of 
the German asset managers agree on the above mentioned statement, only 20% of 
the asset managers from the most individualistic country, the United States, affirm it.
8
 
Following the herd implies the orientation on others. Accordingly, as mentioned 
before in Section 3, we also ask asset managers about the relevance of different 
information sources for their investment decisions. As we have already seen in Table 
4, fundamentals have been agreed to be of high relevance by at least 95% of the 
surveyed asset managers, consistently over all countries. Compared with the results 
                                                        
8
 These differences in behavior over all countries are confirmed to be significant by the Kruskal-
Wallis-Test (results are not explicitly shown here). 
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11 
concerning other sources of information shown in Table 5, fundamentals are thus 
judged to be the most important source of information. Furthermore discussions with 
colleagues take the second position in all countries: An evident majority of the sur-
veyed asset managers judge collegial exchange to be of high relevance. 
Taking the other three information sources into account, a difference between 
Germany and the United States on the one hand, and Japan and Thailand on he 
other hand becomes obvious. Our results show consistently over all considered in-
formation sources where other market players are integrated that asset managers 
from the more individual western countries seem to orientate themselves less on 
others than the more collectivistic eastern countries do.
9
 
Before jumping to conclusions, however, we want to look at possible causes of 
herd behavior. Might it be beneficial for an asset manager’s career and thus be ra-
tional for the individual asset manager to “hide in the herd”? What role do personal 
characteristics such as age or experience play? Does the industry incentive struc-
ture in general and its country-specific type
10
 or the fund characteristic matter? In the 
following, we therefore apply a multivariate ordered probit approach in order to de-
tect possible reasons behind asset managers’ herding behavior (proxied by the 
“trend following”-variable, see Figure 2).
11
 Results are shown in Table 6. The first 
regression [A] considers single countries as clusters and contains variables being 
related to the herding literature as addressed above as well as a set of control vari-
ables. We will refer to the latter whenever we return to multivariate considerations. 
All factors included for control purpose are specific to the individual asset manager 
                                                        
9
  A comprehensive theoretical discussion of the influence of social and cultural norms on individ-
ual’s decision making processes as well as the individual orientation on reference groups can be 
found in Hayakawa (2000). Returning to our empirical findings, we also controlled our sample for 
possible biases, such as those due to an extraordinary high participation among higher positions 
as can be found in the United States sample (see Table 2). CEOs and CIOs would be expected to 
orientate less on others than their younger counterparts. However, except for a weak correlation 
among position and orientation on opinion leaders of the industry, correlations are not at all signifi-
cant. This indicates that cultural differences might indeed play an important role here. 
10
  The type of incentives could be linked to the development stage of the respective financial market. 
However, it does not seem very obvious how the four considered countries should be classified 
with respect to different aspects in financial market development. Assuming this influence to be 
correlated with income per capita, the resulting order USA – JP – GER – TH is different from all of 
the four cultural dimensions we are addressing. Thus, by neglecting development stages we might 
miss a determinant of behavior, but at least we do not wrongly interpret financial market develop-
ment as cultural difference. 
11
  We use the non-parametric ordered probit approach due to the non-metric nature of variables. 
Estimations are calculated applying the robust Huber/White/sandwich estimator and adjusting 
standard errors for intragroup correlations as suggested by Wooldridge (2003, 2006)(the Stata “ro-
bust cluster” procedure). We thank the referee for this advice. 
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and, in parts, have also been treated in the herding literature before. In detail, these 
factors are the asset manager’s experience, age, and position, all implying her de-
gree of establishment and self assessment (see e.g. Avery and Chevalier 1999, and 
Lamont 2002), her educational background, the size of company the asset manager 
is working for (expressed in worldwide assets under management) as a proxy of her 
individual information and research facilities access, the asset manager’s working 
effort and finally the individual manager’s fund characteristics, for example, the type 
of fund (bonds vs. equities), the kind of assets under management (pension vs. mu-
tual fund) and the tracking error allowed (high code for indexing). 
The second regression [B] of Table 6 is restricted to those variables that are at 
least significant at the 10% level, including a summarized Individualism indicator.  
What do we learn about the determinants of herding behavior? First of all, the 
fact that herding is regarded as beneficial for the asset manager’s career proves to 
be an important and highly significant determinant of herding behavior. Second, the 
above mentioned orientation on other market players as well as on opinion leaders 
from both the economy and the asset management industry itself all show the ex-
pected positive coefficients, though partly lack significance. Third, the formerly ad-
dressed coherence of herding behavior with a significant lower reliance on funda-
mentals is also confirmed by our multivariate regression results. All these outcomes 
are in line with theory and expectation. However, what appears most interesting for 
us is whether culture in form of an individualism factor also matters. As described 
above, we firstly consider country clustering to capture country specific factors [A], 
before secondly taking an additional pooled Individualism factor into account [B]. In 
accordance with cultural theory and the Hofstede framework, we find culture to mat-
ter significantly as Individualism has the predicted sign: The more individualistic the 
home country of the surveyed asset manager is, the less likely she is to show herd-
ing behavior.
12
 We find this cohesion to be significant at the 1% level. 
Regarding our set of control variables, we find the asset manager’s experience 
(consistent with expectation and theory) to matter significantly in both regressions. 
More experienced asset managers feel more skillful and surely less threatened by 
                                                        
12
 The same result is found when we use country dummies (instead of anonymous country clusters). 
The United States dummy, standing for the most individualistic country, shows a significant nega-
tive coefficient while the country dummies of the more collectivistic countries Thailand and Japan 
have positive coefficients. 
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the industry’s “hire and fire” career menace than their inexperienced colleagues.
13
 As 
a logical consequence the negative coefficient implies that experienced asset man-
agers are less keen on hiding in the herd than their less experienced and, as we 
have seen in Table 2, on average younger and lower positioned counterparts. This 
is in line with a negative significant coefficient for position. Interestingly, we find 
higher age to influence herding behavior positively (although not to a significant de-
gree). At first glance, this finding seems contradictive. However, if the degree of 
herding behavior could also be understood as a proxy for risk taking (see e.g. Gra-
ham 1999, Hong et al. 2000), our tentative finding might be explained by a negative 
correlation of risk taking with age as found in several studies (see e.g. Andersen 
2001 or Dohmen et al. 2005). Regarding education, we find those asset managers 
with a lower educational degree to be more prone to herding behavior. Also the last 
significant variable is intuitively plausible as index fund managers herd less. More-
over, asset managers who work for bigger companies are expected to be or at least 
to feel better informed than their colleagues working for smaller firms and they thus 
tend to herd less than their counterparts. The same can be found for weekly working 
hours. The negative, though not significant coefficient implies those asset managers 
who show more effort also to herd tentatively less. 
Summarizing our results so far, we find several factors, as predicted by earlier 
work, to determine the observed herding phenomenon. Additionally, as proposed by 
our applied cultural framework, our results also show that the cultural dimension of 
Individualism exerts an independent, stable and significant influence on asset man-
agers’ (herding) behavior. 
 
4.2 Power Distance 
In the following we take a closer look at Hofstede’s dimension of Power Distance, 
generally speaking the degree of inequalities of power, wealth, and prestige, and its 
tolerance within a country’s society. According to Hofstede, Thailand shows the 
highest scoring at 64, followed by Japan, with some distance the United States, and 
finally Germany with a scoring of 35 in this dimension. Different from the dimension 
of Individualism, however, where the United States hold the global leading position, 
                                                        
13
  It seems completely plausible that they may be more skillful indeed, as they survived the competi-
tion, whereas less skillful asset managers may have been driven out of business. 
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14 
the top scorer of Power Distance in Hofstede’s original results (2001, p. 127) is Ma-
laysia (PDI score of 104). Compared to a score of 104, our four considered countries 
are relatively close to each other around the global mean in this dimension. Accord-
ingly, Power Distance is harder to capture than the Individualism dimension. Never-
theless, we find three hints for cultural differences among our four countries that we 
summarize in the following.  
First of all, we use the illustrational example of the hierarchical distribution of 
occupied positions by our surveyed asset managers. Although hierarchy and un-
equal distributions of power among members of an organization are the essence of 
the latter (Hofstede 2001, p. 82), cross-country comparisons of the observed hierar-
chical structure reveal some striking differences. In countries that score higher in 
Power Distance, we would expect to find power more unequally distributed, implying 
comparably fewer asset managers in top positions who face a wider basis of asset 
managers in non-leading positions. Splitting the sample therefore into asset manag-
ers (junior and senior) and leading positions (head of asset management team or 
CIO/CEO), Thailand shows the lowest share of leading positions with 16.7%, fol-
lowed by Japan, then Germany, and the United States with the highest share of 
leading positions at 37.9% (see Figure 3). Only the latter disrupt Hofstede’s country 
classification in this dimension as the results in the United States are mainly based 
on the exceptionally high share of responses by CEOs/CIOs in the country’s sub-
sample.
14
 
Second, we are able to observe a complete fit to Hofstede’s dimension scoring 
when taking the asset managers’ age additionally into account (see also Figure 3). 
Considering the mean position difference between the youngest and the oldest age 
group in all countries separately, Thailand shows the highest position mean differ-
ence regarding age groups, and Germany the lowest. This could indicate a less rigid 
and less age dependent hierarchy in the latter country and thus quicker career ad-
vancement opportunities for younger asset managers due to lower Power Distance 
occurrence and preservation. However, even though Power Distance may provide 
                                                        
14
 In parts, the longer asset management history in the United States, especially in comparison to 
Germany or Thailand, might also have helped the industry to mature in its structure and contrib-
uted to a more balanced distribution among all four positions. 
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an explanation here, the relation to an age-dependent hierarchy is not compelling at 
all.
15 
Third, we test our hypothesis by analyzing position and its determinants in a 
multivariate framework. Possible influencing factors to be tested for holding a higher 
position refer to our standard set of control variables as far as being intuitive (i.e. 
longer experience, higher age, higher education or higher working effort).
16
 We first 
estimate the model for the whole sample [A] before allowing for country specific vari-
able considerations [B]. Estimation output is shown in Table 7. As expected and in 
line with Table 2, our estimation reveals highly significant positive coefficients for 
experience, age and educational degree while working effort is positively related to 
position, but significance is missing over all countries. Going more into detail in Ta-
ble 7 [B], however, we can detect striking differences among the four countries, par-
ticularly regarding the relative importance of age versus experience: While for Thai-
land and Japan age is found to be the single most important determinant for reach-
ing a higher position, in the United States and Germany a higher position depends 
much more on the asset manager’s experience. Additionally, in the United States 
and Germany a higher working effort exerts an important significant positive influ-
ence. Therewith, results confirm former observations and underline an apparently 
different role of age and seniority in the four considered countries.
17
 
To sum up, taking the distribution of positions, controlling for age, experience, 
educational degree and weekly working hours, we find significant differences that 
seem to confirm a culturally predicted influence of Power Distance. 
 
4.3 Masculinity – Feminity 
We now turn to the third of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, namely Masculinity (i.e. 
the degree of gender differentiation and traditional role models). While Masculinity is 
Japan’s top dimension with a scoring of 95 and Japan is, according to Hofstede, 
among the global top scorers, respectively, Germany and the United States are 
found in between, and Thailand’s score in this dimension is considerably low at 34. 
                                                        
15
  The referee mentions several counter-examples, such as an army which is characterized by ex-
tremely high Power Distance but not much age-dependent hierarchy. 
16
  Due to questionable explanation power, we exclude company size and fund characteristics from 
our set of control variables here. 
17
  These findings are robust to the inclusion of fund characteristics. Results are available on request. 
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We find evidence in favor of cultural influences on the asset management in-
dustry and its participants also in this dimension. To start the analysis, we refer to 
the gender distribution related to the asset manager’s position in the four surveyed 
countries. Figure 4 shows essential differences between the considered countries 
that can be simply summarized as follows: The more masculine a country is, the less 
women can be found in highly-paid asset management positions. While Japan has 
only a minority (around 3%) of female junior or senior asset managers, Germany 
also lacks women in the leading positions, but there we find at least around 18% of 
female junior asset managers. In the United States sample we find women in all four 
positions (up to 18% female heads of an asset management team) but the sample is 
still far away from being equally distributed. This can only be said about Thailand, 
clearly the most feminine country among the four, where women hold about 40% of 
all asset management positions, almost independent of the hierarchical level.
18
 
Besides position, managed asset volumes and responsibilities are a second 
aspect where gender differentiation might be observable. With the help of an or-
dered probit model, we therefore examine whether gender matters in this respect 
and include a gender variable in addition to our familiar set of control variables 
(namely experience, age, position, educational degree, company size, working effort 
and fund characteristics). Gender differentiation thus brought into a multivariate 
framework is shown in Table 8. The first regression [A] is estimated over all coun-
tries; the second estimation [B] allows for country specific gender considerations. 
While a longer experience shows a positive and highly significant coefficient, imply-
ing more experienced asset managers to be more likely to be responsible for higher 
asset volumes, the age coefficient shows a negative sign but lacks significance in 
both regressions. As expected and in line with Table 2, a higher position also leads 
to significantly higher asset volumes under personal responsibility. Regarding a 
                                                        
18 
 Mann-Whitney-test results (not explicitly shown here) for gender differences regarding position 
reveal significant differences at the 1% level for Germany. For Japan, weak significance may be 
due only to the very small number of female asset managers in the Japanese sample. Among the 
relatively more female cultures, neither the United States nor Thailand show significant gender dif-
ferences. Though these results suit well to cross-cultural predictions, we also consider additional 
aspects as education or experience. No significant gender differences can be found for education. 
In terms of experience, we find significant differences only for the two poles, Japan and Thailand. 
In detail, we find junior positions to be the driving force in Japan, observing male junior asset 
managers to be significantly more experienced then their female counterparts. For Thailand, fe-
male asset managers are slightly more experienced over all positions but differences are never 
significant. 
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higher educational degree and longer weekly working hours, we find negative and 
partly highly significant coefficients: While the first aspect points towards a “learning 
on the job” practice, higher working efforts obviously do not automatically imply 
higher responsibilities. However, working for a bigger company is, as expected, 
linked to significantly higher asset volumes under personal responsibility. Coming to 
the most interesting point, being male can be considered as a tentative systematic 
career advantage. A positive although insignificant coefficient over all countries in 
the first regression is confirmed by three highly significant country specific gender 
coefficients in the second regression. For all three countries considered in regres-
sion [B], we find male asset managers to manage significantly higher volumes than 
their female counterparts. Moreover, in line with cultural predictions, we reveal that 
the more masculine a country is, the higher is the coefficient of the gender variable. 
To summarize, both descriptive distributional comparisons of position and mul-
tivariate regressions show that gender differences are more important career deter-
minants for societies like Japan and Germany that also score high in Hofstede’s di-
mension of Masculinity than for those that are judged to be relatively more feminine 
societies such as the United States or Thailand.  
 
4.4 Uncertainty Avoidance 
The last considered dimension, Uncertainty Avoidance, deals with societal coping 
with uncertainty. Depending on the respective tolerance level, societies have deter-
mined different coping measures towards, for example, technology, institutional 
structure, law and (decision) rules to overcome uncertainty. Hofstede (2001, p.148ff.) 
explicitly refrains from equating Uncertainty Avoidance with risk avoidance. Accord-
ingly, risk is focused on a specific event, its probability and its outcome, whereas 
uncertainty is a more diffuse sentiment. According to Hofstede (2001, p.151), Japan 
shows by far the highest Uncertainty Avoidance scoring results at 92, being followed 
by Germany and Thailand and finally the United States with the relatively lowest 
scoring of 46.  
Before analyzing the degree of uncertainty avoidance, brief background infor-
mation on asset managers' environment appears necessary. In general, asset man-
agers do not invest on their own accounts but manage entrusted assets on behalf of 
their customers. Depending on the company’s risk-return policies, individual per-
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formance as well as factors such as experience or position, asset managers might 
be more or less allowed to compose their portfolios freely. To put it in the extremes, 
they might either be forced to stick to the benchmark (i.e. a market index) or be al-
lowed to deviate clearly from it, showing a so-called high tracking error (i.e. accept-
ing higher risks and higher outcome uncertainty by deviating from the benchmark). 
However, given a wide leeway does not necessarily mean using it. Especially a more 
uncertainty avoidant asset manager might wish to refrain from deviating too much 
from the market index, even if she were allowed to do so, in order to be on the safer 
side. Accordingly, we consider the mean difference between the tracking error that 
asset managers would be allowed and the one they actually risk. As we can see from 
Figure 5, the difference between the allowed level and the actual tracking error is 
maximal for Japan, indicating that Japanese asset managers stick relatively closest 
to their benchmarks. Germany shows the second biggest difference, followed by the 
USA, and Thailand. Except for the last two, this matches the order of Hofstede re-
garding the avoidance of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
In the asset management industry where decisions are made under uncertainty 
and risk, comprehensive information research is essential. Nevertheless, different 
degrees of Uncertainty Avoidance might imply different effort intensities to solve un-
certainty in order to fulfill the individual desire to maintain clarity. While information 
quality itself is unobservable, the survey allows us to compare asset managers’ ef-
forts by the time they spend on information research relative to their overall working 
hours. Results are also shown in Figure 5. Asset managers from Japan, the most 
uncertainty avoidant country, spend, with 45%, the highest percentage of their (al-
ready in absolute numbers higher) weekly working hours (see Table 2) on explicit 
information research. They are followed by Germany and Thailand, whereas asset 
managers from the United States, the relatively least uncertainty avoidant country, 
spend the smallest portion on average of their working hours on information re-
search. 
These results fit well into the culture framework. Nevertheless, univariate con-
siderations always lack control for interferences since the considered tracking error 
difference might be influenced by a variety of factors. Especially the tracking error 
allowed should be accounted for. We therefore, once again, apply our set of control 
variables. Additionally, we also consider country clusters [A] and directly test for the 
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cultural factor’s impact [B]. As Table 9 shows, four variables have a consistently sig-
nificant and intuitively plausible influence. The tracking error difference is lower for 
asset managers in higher positions and those working less. Moreover, the tracking 
error allowed exerts a significant negative influence on the asset manager’s tracking 
error difference (i.e. managers who command over a potentially large tracking error 
use their degree of freedom less than others); the extreme others are index fund 
managers who, of course, do not deviate from their hardly existent tracking error.
19
 
Finally, and of particular interest here, Uncertainty Avoidance captured in one vari-
able [B] positively influences the tracking error difference to a highly significant de-
gree. This indicates that also this cultural dimension is important in understanding 
asset managers’ decisions.
20
 
To sum up, we find evidence that also the last of Hofstede’s dimensions, Un-
certainty Avoidance, matters. Asset managers from more uncertainty avoidant coun-
tries refrain from composing their portfolios as freely as they could try to countervail 
missing certainty by higher information research effort. 
 
5 Discussion of cultural influences' possible implications 
The preceding Section 4 has shown that asset managers’ views and behavior as 
well as the industry’s structure differ between countries in a way that is clearly re-
lated to expectations derived from Hofstede's cultural dimensions. In this section we 
discuss to what extent these cultural differences may be important for financial mar-
kets: Not only could herding behavior, influenced by the degree of Individualism, 
have a direct impact on market prices and efficiency, but also Power Distance, Mas-
culinity, and Uncertainty Avoidance affect strategic investment decisions and behav-
ior. 
Starting with the Individualism dimension, we clearly find that more individualis-
tic countries have asset managers who follow market trends less closely (i.e. they 
show less herding). Analyzing different aspects of herding behavior reveals, first, 
                                                        
19
  Results are robust to the exclusion of the variable “tracking error allowed”, which is by construction 
highly correlated to the dependent variable. However, the pseudo R-square is much lower and the 
managers from larger companies and with longer working hours seem to stick closer to their 
benchmarks (10 percent level of significance). 
20
 If we consider country dummies explicitly, they matter consistently with results shown in Table 9. 
While Japan, the most uncertainty avoidant country, does not show a significant difference relative 
to Germany, less uncertainty avoidant countries, namely Thailand and the United States, reveal 
negative coefficients at the 1% level of significance. 
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some relation to rational opportunistic behavior (i.e. following the trend because this 
may support one's career). Second, herding is seen as a way to learn from others 
(importance of other market players etc.). Third, herding seems to be performed be-
cause asset managers do believe in psychological forces in the market (less impor-
tance of fundamentals). Fourth, another strong relation exists between herding and 
having an information disadvantage (less education or working for a smaller com-
pany), and fifth, personal experience and career steps matter significantly. In addi-
tion to these many influences, the cultural dimension of Individualism is also shown 
to contribute to a better understanding of herding. There is thus useful evidence that 
cultural differences cause different behavior, yet the way how behavior is changed 
may be complex due to further factors such as the type of financial system and its 
degree of development, the information surrounding it, or the regulatory framework.  
One may speculate that herding in Germany is more opportunistically career 
driven while in Thailand possibly more caused by the motivation to learn from opin-
ion leaders. As these motivations are weaker in Japan, it may be that the cultural 
norm is strongest there (for theoretical considerations see Hayakawa). Additionally, 
in their empirical work Kim and Nofsinger (2005) assume that Japanese institutional 
investors, due to the regulative and relational setting, suffer less from the asymmet-
ric information framework than asset managers in the United States, and they thus 
attribute herding in the Japanese market to superior information, so-called investiga-
tive herding (see also Froot et al. 1992, Hirshleifer et al. 1994). Accordingly, judging 
the impact of herding critically depends on the kind of herding that is supported by 
the cultural dimension. H rding being rooted in opportunistic and uninformed behav-
ior will reduce price efficiency and will induce the danger of contagion and thus the 
spread out of financial crises (see e.g. Calvo and Mendoza 2000, Borensztein and 
Gelos 2003, Shiller 2003 or Chari and Kehoe 2003). However, herding that is based 
on fundamental information gathering can speed up the process by which informa-
tion is reflected in prices.  
The second cultural dimension, Power Distance, was identified in asset man-
agement mainly in the role that age plays in getting into the upper hierarchy. Coun-
tries with more Power Distance put more emphasis on seniority so that the bosses 
who decide about strategic investment directions are comparatively older. This may 
be important as we know that age influences investment behavior, especially risk 
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taking, and might thus lead to a more conservative portfolio allocation. Moreover, 
there are systematic differences with regard to the relative importance of age and 
experience in receiving leading positions: Societies scoring higher in Power Dis-
tance not only prefer older managers for promotion, but they also consider experi-
ence less. Experience is known to have some favorable impact on investment be-
havior in that it reduces herding (see Chevalier and Ellison 1999), enhances learn-
ing about one’s own competences (see Prendergast and Stole 1996), and dilutes 
overconfidence to some degree (see e.g. Gervais and Odean 2001, Locke and Mann 
2003, Menkhoff et al. 2006). 
Masculinity, the third cultural dimension, is also clearly found in international 
asset management. In all countries, there are more men than women in asset man-
agement, and they are overrepresented in leading positions as well with respect to 
higher asset volumes under personal responsibility. However, the more masculine a 
country is, the higher is the degree of male overrepresentation, even when we con-
trol for further possible determinants. This is important for investment decisions as 
we know that men invest differently from women, basically by a more aggressive and 
often less risk averse stance that is identified by generating higher turnover ratios 
with male overconfidence assumed to be the driving force (see Barber and Odean 
2001).
21
 Accordingly, one can imagine that more masculine countries are character-
ized (at least when we consider this dimension alone) by more aggressive invest-
ment styles generating higher turnover for the entrusted asset volumes. 
Finally, the fourth cultural dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance also impacts in-
vestment behavior. The above analysis has shown that Uncertainty Avoidance is 
related to the degree of an underutilized tracking error (i.e. a safety margin). This 
leads to the problem that asset managers will not invest as actively as allowed. Ac-
cording to theory, a higher tracking error that is used to increase portfolio risk should 
lead, on average and in the longer run, to higher returns compared to the bench-
mark. Thus, Uncertainty Avoidance may be a reason for lower returns generated by 
                                                        
21
  Further empirical research is provided by Bengtsson et al. (2005) and Schubert et al. (1999). 
While the former confirm male overconfidence, the latter stress that gender differences found in 
financial decision making experiments might strongly depend on the decision frame; for abstract 
gambles they reveal gender differences indeed, but for contextual and covenant investment and 
insurance decisions, however, they do not. In contrast, Eckel and Grossman (2005) find women to 
be significantly more risk averse than men in both gambles and investment treatments. Further re-
search on this aspect is needed. 
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affected asset managers. There is, however, also a positive side to this cultural di-
mension: In order to reduce uncertainty, it seems plausible that asset managers in 
these societies put more effort into information research. Whether this is always effi-
cient may be another question, but at least it can help to gain more information and 
thus to invest more successfully. 
Again, we see, as with the other dimensions, that cultural differences translate 
into different behavior and that these differences are relevant for investment behav-
ior. Unfortunately, the relations are complex, first because countries have different 
orderings in the four cultural dimensions, and second because cultural influences do 
not always impact behavior to the same extent and in the same direction. Thus, one 
cannot draw the conclusion that asset managements' behavior will simply differ be-
tween two culturally different countries. One can say, however, that the rigidity of 
traditional capital market theory (as referred to in Section 3) is inferior to an under-
standing that incorporates cultural norms. The same kind of reasoning has been 
made by researchers in economics (Akerlof 2007) and may offer an approach to-
wards developing behavioral economics and finance in a more general framework. In 
summary, the influences from cultural diversity seem to be important enough to be 
considered, even in fund management. 
 
6 Concluding remarks and future prospects 
This research enters new ground by presenting comparative survey evidence on 
asset managers’ views and behavior in four countries: the United States, Germany, 
Japan and Thailand. According to the globalization of financial markets, evident for 
example by the same theories used to support portfolio allocation and by the interna-
tional operation of asset management firms, the question emerges of whether cul-
tural differences between countries would play any role in this worldwide business. 
Relying on Hofstede's four cultural dimensions, we find cultural differences to 
be most helpful in understanding country differences that cannot be explained by 
pure economic reasoning alone. In short, even when controlled for various determi-
nants, more Individualism explains less herding behavior, more Power Distance 
leads to relatively older managers in the upper hierarchy, Masculinity generates men 
in top positions and implies a strong gender influence on managed asset volumes 
under personal responsibility, and higher Uncertainty Avoidance is related to higher 
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safety margins against the tracking error allowed and more research effort. These 
consequences (i.e. the culturally different importance of herding, age, experience, 
gender, active asset management style and information research effort) clearly im-
pact investment behavior. Unfortunately, the impact is complex. Thus, it may be in-
teresting not only to test robustness of our findings but also to examine further con-
sequences for each country. 
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FIGURE 1. Country scores
1
 in cultural dimensions according to Hofstede 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
  For the United States, Germany, Japan and Thailand, scores in Hofstede’s following four dimensions are 
shown here: Individualism (IDV), Power Distance (PDI), Masculinity (MAS) and Uncertainty Avoidance 
(UAI). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Comparison of the sample with the industry's structure
1
 
 
Structure of the asset management industry in relation to 
respective country sub sample 
(by assets under management) 
 USA GER JP TH 
H0: no difference
2
 -1.213 
(0.225) 
-0.669  
(0.503) 
-1.183 
(0.237) 
-0.136 
(0.892) 
 Correlation
3
 with company size 
(by assets under management) 
Number of answered  
questionnaires per 
company 
0.256** 
(0.033) 
0.679*** 
(0.000) 
0.545*** 
(0.000) 
0.534*** 
(0.000) 
1
 The market data for the USA is taken from on the 'Pensions & Investments' money managers directory 
2003 (www.pionline.com). For Germany, market data is taken from the annual report 2003 of the BVI. 
Japanese market data refers to The Trust Companies Association of Japan, Japan Securities Investment 
Advisors Association, and The Investment Trust Association Japan. Thailand data is taken from a market 
share datasheet provided by selected companies of the Thai asset management industry and private infor-
mation provided by the AIMC.  
2
 The table gives the z-value of the Mann-Whitney U-Test with the p-value in parentheses.  
3
 The table gives the coefficient of the Pearson correlation with the p-value in parentheses.  
Asterisks refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 2.  Sample composition and respondents' characteristics
1
 
   CEO / 
CIO 
Head 
of 
team 
Senior 
asset  
manager 
Junior
2
 
asset  
manager 
Total / 
Average 
Number of responses 17.9% 20.0% 46.9% 15.2% N=148 
Age in years 47 42 42 31 42 
Experience in years 15 15 13 4 13 
Weekly working hours 55 53 51 52 52 
 Spearman rank correlation
3
 of higher position 
with 
USA 
Higher managed volumes
4
 0.270*** (0.001)  
Number of responses 5.5% 16.4% 46.1% 32.0% N=263 
Age in years 43 38 37 31 36 
Experience in years 14 8 7 <4 7 
Weekly working hours 54 52 48 49 49 
 Spearman rank correlation
3
 of higher position 
with 
GER 
Higher managed volumes
4
 0.469*** (0.000) 
Number of responses 2.3% 17.9% 18.3% 61.5% N=488 
Age in years 48 41 40 36 38 
Experience in years 15 14 12 9 11 
Weekly working hours 53 55 53 54 54 
 Spearman rank correlation
3
 of higher position 
with 
JP 
Higher managed volumes
4
  0.291*** (0.000) 
Number of responses 4.8% 11.9% 45.2% 38.1% N=126 
Age in years 42 39 37 31 35 
Experience in years 11 10 8 4 7 
Weekly working hours 46 48 45 45 45 
 Spearman rank correlation
3
 of higher position 
with 
TH 
Higher managed volumes
4
  0.331*** (0.000) 
1 
Mean values for age, experience and weekly working hours are given for each position in the respective 
country. 
2 
In Japan the lowest position was entitled more generally as “Asset Manager”. This broader classification 
might imply a bias in favor of a high number of responses in this answering category. 
3
 The table gives the coefficient of the Spearman rank correlation with the p-value in parentheses. Asterisks 
refer to level of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
4
 Higher managed volumes indicate that an asset manager has a higher amount of financial assets under 
personal responsibility.  
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TABLE 3.  Distribution of responses regarding fund characteristics 
  USA GER JP TH 
Mutual fund 30.9% 32.5% 21.5% 32.0% 
Both types 26.5% 16.9% 22.5% 32.0% 
Type of 
fund
1
 
Pension (or 
private) fund 
42.6% 50.6% 55.9% 36.0% 
Equities 58.2% 67.8% 58.2% 39.0% 
Both segments 10.6% 8.3%   5.9% 12.7% 
Investment 
segment
2
 
Bonds 31.2% 24.0% 35.7% 48.3% 
High TE 51.7% 47.2% 63.7% 26.4% 
Medium TE 39.5% 44.8% 30.9% 63.2% 
TE-
allowed
3
 
Low TE/Index.   8.8%   8.1%   5.5% 10.4% 
1
 Type of fund is split into three categories, ranging from mutual funds (coded as 1) to special type of funds 
as pension/provident or restricted/private funds (coded as 3). The middle category captures those asset 
managers who manage both types of funds, mutual and rather special types. 
2
 For the investment segment we split particularly equities management (coded as 1) from the one of fixed-
income funds such as bond and money market funds (coded as 3). Again, a middle group of asset manag-
ers captures both investment segments. 
3
 The allowed tracking error (TE) is assessed as follows: “How actively can you actually manage your portfo-
lio at most?”. Response categories range from high tracking error (coded as 1) to indexing (coded as 6). 
We re-group the six response categories into three groups and classify the first two response categories as 
high TE, categories three and four as medium TE and categories five and six as low TE/Indexing. 
 
 
TABLE 4.  Relevance of fundamentals and the importance of different  
                     investment strategies  
[A]    Relevance of fundamental information: “Please assess the following sources of in-
formation used in making investment ecision" Six response categories, ranging 
from "highest relevance" (coded as 1) to "no relevance" (coded as 6). 
[B]   “Which strategies are your investment decision normally based upon? Please assign 
100% altogether. If a category does not apply, please assign 0% to it.” 
  USA GER JP TH 
[A] Share of high relevance
1 
of: 
Fundamentals 
 
   96.0% 
(-1.074) 
  95.1% 
(-0.913) 
  98.2% 
(-1.264) 
  99.2% 
(-0.945) 
[B] Buy and hold
2
 37.39  26.17 33.17 47.65  
 Momentum  17.50  26.61  23.79  21.43  
 Contrarian  23.08  15.84  26.02  12.27  
 Dividend orientated  6.53  8.61  3.77  16.59  
 Other 15.51  22.91  13.60  2.06  
1
 The table shows the share of high relevance of fundamental information, calculated as aggregated distribu-
tion to the answer categories 1-3. The mean value difference relative to the second most important informa-
tion source, namely discussion with colleagues, is given in parentheses, respectively. 
2
 The table shows the mean values for the different strategies, expressed in percentages. 
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FIGURE 2.  Trend following 
Country ranking and values according to Hofstede: 
 
 
“I generally follow the trend":  
Six answering categories from "completely agree" to "completely disagree". 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.  Relevance of different information sources 
Country ranking and values according to Hofstede: 
 
 
Relevance of different information sources: “Please assess the following sources of infor-
mation used in making investment decision" Six response categories, ranging from "high-
est relevance" (coded as 1) to "no relevance" (coded as 6). 
 
Share of high relevance
1
 of: 
USA GER JP TH 
Discussion with colleagues 81.8% 
(2.689) 
78.6% 
(2.701) 
80.8% 
(2.619) 
92.1% 
(2.413) 
Other market players
 
 
41.2% 
(3.865) 
31.1% 
(4.171) 
60.7% 
(3.379) 
49.6% 
(3.472) 
Opinion leaders (industry) 
 
25%   
(4.514) 
19.1% 
(4.555) 
41.2% 
(3.936) 
57.1% 
(3.357) 
Opinion leaders (economy) 
 
33.2%   
(4.142) 
43.3% 
(3.844) 
61.3%   
(3.289) 
89.7% 
(2.349) 
1
 The table shows the share of high relevance calculated as aggregated distribution to the answer categories 
1-3. Mean values are given in parentheses. Performed Kruskal-Wallis-Tests show that the Null-hypotheses 
of no difference between our four considered countries cannot be rejected for discussions with colleagues. 
However, for the other three infomation sources, significant differences over all countries are confirmed at 
the 1% level. Test outcomes are not explicitly shown here. 
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TABLE 6.  Herding in a multivariate framework 
                    Ordered PROBIT regressions of herding (trend following) behavior
1
 
[A]  including diverse variables 
[B]   with a summarized Individualism variable and reduced number of variables  
       (restricted to the 10% level of significance) 
 [A] [B] 
Career benefit 0.160 (0.018)*** 0.185 (0.031)*** 
Orientation on other market players 0.070 (0.011)*** 0.089 (0.021)*** 
Orientation on opinion leaders (industry) 0.045 (0.046)***   
Orientation on opinion leaders (economy) 0.086 (0.061)**   
Relevance of fundamental information -0.138 (0.046)*** -0.186 (0.078)*** 
Higher Individualism   -0.302 (0.090)*** 
Longer experience -0.049 (0.022)** -0.022 (0.005)*** 
Higher age 0.027 (0.050)   
Higher position -0.035 (0.009)*** -0.026 (0.007)*** 
Higher educational degree -0.018 (0.018)*** -0.092 (0.031)*** 
Bigger company -0.024 (0.025)   
Longer weekly working hours -0.010 (0.016)   
Pension fund (vs. mutual fund) 0.004 (0.052)   
Bond segment (vs. equity) -0.023 (0.041)   
Index fund (vs. high tracking error) -0.073 (0.020)*** -0.085 (0.023)*** 
Log pseudolikelihood -1500.645 -1579.2561 
(Pseudo)-R
2
 0.046 0.058 
1
 Herding is measured by way of the trend following-variable introduced in Figure 2 above. The table gives 
the coefficients of the ordered PROBIT regression with applied cluster sample method according to 
Wooldridge (2003, 2006). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks refer to level of significance: * 
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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FIGURE 3.  Hierarchy structure, age and Power Distance 
Country ranking and values according to Hofstede: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 The share of leading positions is calculated as aggregated distribution to the answer categories 3 (= ”Head 
of Asset Management Team”) and 4 (= “CEO/CIO”). 
 
TABLE 7.  Position in a multivariate framework 
    Ordered PROBIT regressions
1
 of position 
[A]   over the whole sample 
[B]   with country specific variables consideration  
 [A] [B] 
Longer experience 0.124 (0.038)***   
Longer experience TH   0.345 (0.028)*** 
Longer experience JP   0.090 (0.010)*** 
Longer experience USA   0.208 (0.010)*** 
Longer experience GER   0.160 (0.016)*** 
Higher age 0.329 (0.065)***   
Higher age TH   0.610 (0.049)*** 
Higher age JP   0.425 (0.016)*** 
Higher age USA   0.193 (0.100)*** 
Higher age GER   0.282 (0.011)*** 
Higher educational degree 0.128 (0.020)***   
Higher educational degree TH   -0.312 (0.156)** 
Higher educational degree JP   -0.026 (0.029) 
Higher educational degree USA   0.024 (0.027) 
Higher educational degree GER   0.012 (0.063) 
Longer weekly working hours  0.016 (0.024)   
Longer weekly working hours TH   0.013 (0.006)** 
Longer weekly working hours JP   -0.024 (0.042) 
Longer weekly working hours USA   0.151 (0.026)*** 
Longer weekly working hours GER   0.191 (0.029)*** 
Log likelihood -1177.135 -1130.005 
(Pseudo)-R
2
 0.109 0.144 
                  Power Distance 
 
Thailand – Japan – USA – Germany 
     64             54        40   35 
 
Share of leading positions1
in %
Mean position difference between 
youngest and oldest age group
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1
 The table gives the coefficients of the ordered PROBIT regression with applied cluster sample method ac-
cording to Wooldridge (2003, 2006). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks refer to level of 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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FIGURE 4.  Gender distribution  
Country ranking and values according to Hofstede: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 8.  Gender differences in a multivariate framework 
    Ordered PROBIT regressions
1
 of asset volume under personal responsibility 
[A]   over the whole sample 
[B]   with country specific gender consideration  
 [A] [B]
2
 
Longer experience 0.101 (0.038)*** 0.097 (0.040)** 
Higher age -0.008 (0.047) -0.008 (0.051) 
Higher position 0.088 (0.018)*** 0.092 (0.019)*** 
Higher educational degree -0.105 (0.015)*** -0.070 (0.016)*** 
Longer weekly working hours 0.077 (0.040)* 0.065 (0.041) 
Bigger company 0.211 (0.007)* 0.208 (0.007)*** 
Male asset manager 0.040 (0.045)   
Male asset manager GER   0.157 (0.063)** 
Male asset manager USA   0.140 (0.071)** 
Male asset manager TH   0.111 (0.053)** 
Pension fund (vs. mutual fund) 0.162 (0.052)*** 0.151 (0.056)*** 
Bond segment (vs. equity) 0.140 (0.062)** 0.138 (0.061)** 
Index fund (vs. high tracking error) 0.063 (0.037)* 0.067 (0.037)* 
Log likelihood -1659.762 -1654.756 
(Pseudo)-R
2
 0.083 0.086 
1
 The table gives the coefficients of the ordered PROBIT regression with applied cluster sample method ac-
cording to Wooldridge (2003, 2006). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks refer to level of 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
2 
We refrained from including a gender specific consideration for Japan due to the very limited number of 
female respondents. 
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FIGURE 5.  Tracking Error difference and research hours as proxies for  
 Uncertainty Avoidance
1 
Country ranking and values according to Hofstede: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 Mean values are given for each country. The tracking error scale in the questionnaire ranges from “1” (high 
tracking error) to “5” (low tracking error = indexing). Thus, the lower the value, the more the asset managers 
tend to accept outcome uncertainty by deviating from the benchmark in forms of a market index. Here, only 
the difference between the actual and the possible tracking error is shown.  
 Weekly research time comprises time for “data procurement and information research”. It is shown here in 
relation to weekly working hours. 
 
 
TABLE 9.  Tracking error difference in a multivariate framework 
    Ordered PROBIT regressions
1
 of tracking error difference 
[A]   including diverse variables 
[B]   with a summarized Uncertainty Avoidance variable 
 [A] [B] 
Longer experience 0.009 (0.042) 0.002 (0.036) 
Higher age -0.052 (0.037) -0.034 (0.020)* 
Higher position -0.149 (0.054)*** -0.034 (0.005)*** 
Higher educational degree -0.109 (0.046)** -0.015 (0.025) 
Longer weekly working hours 0.061 (0.022)*** 0.042 (0.016)** 
Bigger company 0.022 (0.031) 0.006 (0.022) 
Higher Uncertainty Avoidance   0.283 (0.045)*** 
Pension fund (vs. mutual fund) 0.052 (0.057) 0.028 (0.059) 
Bond segment (vs. equity) 0.021 (0.042) 0.018 (0.039) 
Index fund (vs. high tracking error) -0.600 (0.045)*** -0.594 (0.044)*** 
Log likelihood -930.659 -909.931 
(Pseudo)-R
2
 0.154 0.173 
1
 The table gives the coefficients of the ordered PROBIT regression with applied cluster sample method ac-
cording to Wooldridge (2003, 2006). Standard errors are given in parentheses. Asterisks refer to level of 
significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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